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Abstract
There is considerable interest in comparative research on different species’ abilities to respond to human communicative
cues such as gaze and pointing. It has been reported that some canines perform significantly better than monkeys and apes
on tasks requiring the comprehension of either declarative or imperative pointing and these differences have been
attributed to domestication in dogs. Here we tested a sample of chimpanzees on a task requiring comprehension of an
imperative request and show that, though there are considerable individual differences, the performance by the apes rival
those reported in pet dogs. We suggest that small differences in methodology can have a pronounced influence on
performance on these types of tasks. We further suggest that basic differences in subject sampling, subject recruitment and
rearing experiences have resulted in a skewed representation of canine abilities compared to those of monkeys and apes.
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Introduction
An important aspect of socio-communicative development in
human children is the emergence of both the comprehension and
production of pointing. Around 6 months of age, developing
children begin to orient and follow human social communicative
cues such as gaze and pointing [1,2]. From around 12 to 15
months of age, the production of manual gestures emerges; these
gestures are often directed to objects in the environment and
accompanied by alternation of gaze between the referent and
social agent [3,4]. These early non-verbal communication abilities
are an important stage in the development of a variety of cognitive
and communicative abilities of human children. For instance,
studies have shown that the age of onset of pointing is correlated
with the onset of speech later in life [5,6]. Furthermore, there is
some evidence that delays in the onset or deficits in both the
comprehension and production of pointing gestures are diagnostic
of neurodevelopmental disorders such as specific language
impairment and, notably autism spectrum disorder [7,8].
From a comparative standpoint, studies in great apes and to a
lesser extent monkeys have shown that they will use manual
gestures to request food that is otherwise unattainable to them [9–
11]. Further, ape gestures are sensitive to the presence of an
audience, and are produced in conjunction with alternation of
gaze between the referent and social agent, much like that has
been described in developing human children [9,12,13]. From the
comprehension perspective, studies in a variety of species have
shown that they can follow gaze [14,15] and to a lesser extent
pointing [9,16–18]. With regard to comprehension of pointing,
there have been a number of reports suggesting that other species,
notably dogs, perform significantly better than most primate
species including great apes and monkeys [e.g., 19]. Specifically,
initial studies reported that chimpanzees and other apes were poor
at a specific pointing comprehension task, referred to as the object
choice task (OCT). In the OCT, one of two or more opaque
containers is baited with a food item. A human experimenter then
points to the baited container, indicating which of the objects the
subject should choose when provided with an opportunity to make
a choice. In contrast to apes and monkeys, dogs perform quite well
on the OCT and some have attributed these species differences to
the influence of domestication or degree of socialization with
humans [e.g., 19,20,21]. More recent studies have offered some
more parsimonious explanations for the apparent differences
between dogs and apes on the OCT, notably factors associated
with the methodology and procedures used to assess OCT abilities
between species [22,23]. When comparable methods of OCT
assessment are used, species differences in OCT performance
dissipate.
In the current study, we address a more recent claim that dogs
outperform chimpanzees on a version of the OCT in which the
subjects are required to comprehend an imperative request
[20,24]. A distinction often made between the gestures of apes
and human children is in their type and functional use; specifically,
human children’s gestures are classified as (a) requestive (imper-
ative) or (b) declarative in function. Imperative pointing is
described as the instrumental use of gestures by individuals to
request a specific action and object. In contrast, declarative
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pointing is defined as the motivation to indicate an event or object
in the environment for the purposes of showing or, more richly, to
share in joint attention. Within this framework, it has been
hypothesized that human children produce both imperative and
declarative pointing whereas apes and other animals only produce
imperative pointing. This distinction has been previously used to
account for the poor performance of chimpanzees on the OCT,
the idea being that great apes do not understand the helpful
intentions of experimenters who are pointing to baited containers
[e.g., 20].
More recently, some have questioned not only the abilities of
chimpanzees to comprehend declarative but also imperative
gestures. Kirchhofer et al. [24] compared a sample of dogs and
chimpanzees on a task not unlike the OCT but differed slightly in
that the subjects were asked to retrieve one of two similar, but not
identical objects that was requested by a human experimenter
with, among other cues, a pointing gesture. In other words, the
subjects were asked to return an object that was imperatively
pointed to by a human experimenter. Kirchhofer et al. [24]
reported that none of the 23 chimpanzees they tested were able to
succeed on this task whereas 9 of the 32 dogs performed
significantly better than chance. It should be noted that 73 dogs
were recruited for this study, but only 32 (44%) displayed sufficient
motivation to complete the tasks. In contrast, 20 of 23
chimpanzees (87%) completed testing. Thus, the dogs were
significantly less likely to complete the experiment than were the
chimpanzees (x2(1, N=96) = 13.10, p,.001), but the dogs were
relatively more successful at retrieving the specific object
requested, if they did complete testing. These authors interpreted
these findings as evidence that domestication of dogs over time has
resulted in their ability to detect the meaning and intent of human
gestural commands.
The poor performance of the chimpanzees in the task used by
Kirchhofer et al. [24] is somewhat surprising for two reasons.
First, as noted above, there are numerous studies showing that
chimpanzees and other great apes reliably produce imperative
gestures [reviewed by 25,26]. It seems odd that chimpanzees
would be capable of producing imperative gestures yet be
incapable of comprehending them. Second, the poor performance
by the chimpanzees is entirely inconsistent with a fairly large body
of literature showing that apes can comprehend gestures, signs and
even human speech cues [e.g., 27,28–32].
We have known for some time that apes can select specific
objects from an array when presented with pointing gestures,
acquired human signs and human spoken English words [e.g.,
27,30,32]. For some examples, Gua, an infant chimpanzee,
comprehended imperative points, accompanied by verbal com-
mands, to close doors and to retrieve objects [30]. Furness [27]
reported that a chimpanzee and an orangutan often followed his
gaze to the correct target in an array, even when he did not want
them to. Savage-Rumbaugh and colleagues [32] reported superior
comprehension by Kanzi, a bonobo, of numerous spoken
imperatives, when compared to a two-year-old child. Among the
many spoken imperative sentences that Kanzi comprehended
were ‘‘Put the telephone on the TV’’ and ‘‘Put the mushrooms in
the cabinet.’’ There are numerous additional published examples
of great apes correctly interpreting either imperative speech or
imperative points, or both [e.g., 9,17,33–35] dating back to
Witmer’s [36] observation, in clinically controlled conditions, that
when Mrs. McArdle asked Peter, a chimpanzee, to ‘‘kiss papa’’, he
duly kissed Mr. McArdle. The proposal that a given species is
capable of comprehending the referents of spoken, but not
gestural, deictic imperatives is extraordinary, but the implications
of this paradox were not developed by Kirchhofer et al. [24].
Given that others have shown that methodological factors play a
critical role in the performance on the OCT in dogs compared to
other animals, notably monkeys and apes [22,23], in this study we
examined whether similar methodological factors might influence
the performance of chimpanzees on a task requiring that they
understand a request gesture from a human experimenter. Rather
than have the chimpanzees retrieve objects that were requested,
we had our subjects respond to human pointing cues and return a
single object to different specific locations, which were requested
via human imperative pointing gestures. If chimpanzees are poor
at comprehending human request gestures, as suggested by
Kirchhofer et al. [24], then we hypothesized they would be
equally poor on our task. Whereas their task involved selecting one
of two objects and delivering it to an experimenter, our task
involved selecting one object and delivering it to one of two or,
later, three locations. Poor performance in this imperative task
would support Kirchhofer et al.’s [24] interpretation that chim-
panzees have difficulty understanding the referents of imperative
points. Conversely, high performance by chimpanzees on the
present version of the task would implicate sampling or other
methodological factors in explaining the differences between their
findings and ours.
Methods
Subjects
The subjects were 35 captive chimpanzees from the Yerkes
National Primate Research Center (YNPRC) of Emory University.
There were 25 female and10 males ranging in age from 15 to 44
years (Mean=21.34 years, s.d. = 10.11). Though the subjects have
been involved in a variety of behavioral and cognitive tasks over
many years, none had been involved in the task used in this study.
Indeed, several studies on communication in the YNPRC
chimpanzees have described their ability to initiate joint attention
[10,13,37]. All of the research conducted with the chimpanzees
was approved by the Emory University Institutional Animal Care
and Use Committee and followed the guidelines for ethical
treatment of chimpanzees outlined by the Institute of Medicine.
All the chimpanzees were housed in social groups ranging from
two to 12 individuals. The chimpanzees are fed twice daily with a
diet that consists of fruits, vegetables and commercially produced
primate chow. Environmental enrichment, such as simulated tool
use tasks or other non-nutritive substrates, were provided to the
chimpanzees on a daily basis.
Procedure
Pretraining. Most of the chimpanzees at the YNPRC will
exchange objects for food items [e.g., 38] and we capitalized on
this ability in the current study. Prior to testing, each chimpanzee
received some training to assure that they understand the response
demands of the task. At the onset of training, a single polyvinyl-
choride (PVC) pipe (approx. 20 cm long and 4.5 cm in diameter)
was placed on the outside mesh of the subject’s home cage. A
small, round rock (approximately 2 cm in diameter) was then
placed in the subject’s home cage, typically in front of the ape. The
subject was then asked to return the rock by pointing with a
cupped hand toward the rock. If the chimpanzee returned the
rock, they received a secondary reinforcer (click of a clicker)
followed by a small food reward (i.e. small piece of fruit or
vegetable or a squirt of diluted juice). We next increased the
response demand by teaching the subjects to place the rock inside
the PVC pipe via successive approximation. The experimenter
initially moved the tube in front of the rock as it was being
returned. Then, the experimenter placed the PVC pipe in the
Understanding Imperative Pointing by Chimpanzees
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mesh and left it stationary while pointing to the pipe and asking
the subject to return the rock into the pipe. Once each subject
successfully returned the rock through the opening in the
stationary PVC pipe four to five times without errors, testing
commenced.
Testing. During the initial phase of testing, we placed two
PVC pipes (approx. 20 cm long and 4.5 cm in diameter) in the
cage mesh on the same horizontal plane, approximately 60 cm
apart such that one end of the pipe was inside the enclosure and
the rest of the pipe extended downwards out of the enclosure. A
single rock (approximately 2 cm in diameter) was placed in the
cage and the experimenter, sitting on a stool centered between the
tubes, then pointed to one of the two PVC pipes, extending their
arm and index finger such that the tip of their index finger was
approximately 5–10 cm from the protruded end of the tube
(approx. 25–30 cm from the end of the tube in which the
chimpanzee placed the rock) while simultaneously saying the word
‘‘tube’’ (see Figure 1). The tube cued was pseudorandomized with
the same tube never being repeated more than three consecutive
trials. If the chimpanzee placed the rock in the correct PVC pipe
(the one cued by the experimenter), they received a secondary
reinforcer (click of a clicker) and a small food reward. Returning
the rock to the wrong PVC pipe (the pipe not cued by the
experimenter) resulted in no reward. After a short inter-trial-
interval (3–5 seconds), the next trial commenced following the
same procedure described above.
Each test session consisted of 20 trials with subjects receiving no
more than 2 sessions per day (separated by a minimum of 2 hours)
and subjects were tested repeatedly until they correctly placed the
rock in the cued PVC pipe on 16 out of 20 trials, which was the
established performance criterion. Upon completion of this initial
testing, we further examined their generalization skills by adding a
third PVC pipe during testing. The third pipe was placed
approximately 35 cm below the horizontal plane of the first two
tubes and centered between them vertically. The procedure was
identical to the initial test phase with two PVC pipes except the
experimenter would now cue to the chimpanzees to return the
rock to one of the three possible PVC pipes located on the cage
mesh. As in the two tube procedure, the selected tube was
pseudorandomized with no tube being cued more than three
consecutive trials. At the beginning of each three-tube testing
session, the subjects received five warm-up trials with two tubes
and were required to respond correctly in four or five of the five
trials in order to proceed with testing. If they failed to respond
correctly in at least 80% of the warm-up trials, 20 additional two-
tube trials were completed. As in the two-tube tests, in the three-
tube tests a correct response was recorded when the chimpanzee
placed the rock in the cued PVC pipe. Correct responses were
followed by a click and a food reward. Two dependent variables
were of interest. First, we recorded the percentage of correct
responses on the first test session in the two and three pipe
conditions. Second, we recorded the number of test sessions
needed to reach criterion for the two and three pipe conditions.
Figure 1. Photograph of the experimental test with PVC pipes placed in the cage and the human experimenter pointing to one of
the pipes.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079338.g001
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Results
The individual data are shown in Table 1. For the two-PVC-
pipe condition, a one-sample t-test showed that, overall, the
chimpanzees performed significantly better than chance or 50%
correct t(34) = 5.70, p,.001 (Mean=66%). Of the 35 chimpanzees,
the range in test sessions needed to reach criterion was 1 to 20 with
just five subjects (5/35 or 14%) failing to reach criterion within 20
test sessions. Eleven chimpanzees performed significantly above
chance (which required a performance of 75% correct or higher)
on the very first test session. Neither sex nor rearing experience
had a significant effect on Session 1 performance. For the three-
PVC-pipe test, 30 chimpanzees were available for testing. As with
the two-PVC-pipe condition, the chimpanzees performed signif-
icantly better than chance, which was 34%, on the first test session
t(29) = 9.51, p,.001 (Mean=71%). Twenty-four of the 30
chimpanzees (80%) responded significantly above chance (which
required performance to be at 55% correct or higher) on the first
test session when confronted with three PVC pipes. A comparison
in the number of test sessions needed to reach criterion showed
that the chimpanzee needed significantly fewer for the three-
(Mean=2.21) compared to two- (Mean= 5.46) PVC-pipe test
conditions t(29) = 3.13, p,.01. Thus, the chimpanzees showed
improved performance on the task across testing conditions. As
noted above, some chimpanzees received some ‘‘warm-up’’ or
refresher trials before testing commenced on the three-PVC
testing. To determine whether the warm-up testing had an impact
on performance, we correlated the number of refresher tests
needed for each chimpanzee with both session one performance
and the number of test sessions needed to reach criterion in the
three-PVC test. Seventeen chimpanzees passed the 5 trial warm
up session on their first test while the remaining 13 needed
between 1 and 6 additional warm up sessions. Not surprisingly,
there was a significant negative association between the number of
refresher sessions and session one performance (r= -.44, N= 30,
p,.02.). Chimpanzees that needed fewer refresher trials did better
on session one performance that those that needed more sessions.
However, we found no significant association between the number
of refresher trials needed and the number of trials to criterion for
the three-tube test (r= .339, N= 30, n.s.).
Discussion
The result reported here are straightforward. Though there
were considerable individual differences within our sample, the
chimpanzees clearly demonstrated significant competencies in
their comprehension of the referents of imperative gestures. Nearly
one-third of the chimpanzees could perform the task with no
specific training and nearly 85% of the subjects learned to perform
the task within the 20 test-session criterion. Furthermore, most
chimpanzees showed generalization in performance in the task
when the number of response options increased from two to three.
Thus, our apes far exceeded the performance of the chimpanzees
and, indeed, rivaled the results reported in dogs by Kirchhofer
et al. [24]. These results directly challenge the claim that
chimpanzees do not understand the referents of imperative
pointing and raise additional questions regarding purported
mechanisms underlying species differences in performance on
object-choice or related types of tasks.
We are not surprised by the findings reported here and believe
that some of the arguments and methodological assumptions
regarding the abilities of dogs and chimpanzees on the OCT and
its variants warrant critical analysis. Specifically, as noted by others
[39] and reinforced here, the methods and approaches used to
evaluate OCT performance can have a significant effect on
performance in different species. A simple change in the manner
that OCT performance was assessed in this study, compared to
that used by Kirchhofer et al. [24], had a significant impact on the
chimpanzees’ performances. In short, methodological factors play
a greater role in explaining individual differences in OCT
performance than either species or other purported mechanisms
such as domestication.
We do not believe that there is anything special about our
chimpanzees that accounts for their performance but, rather, we
simply designed the task around abilities that have been well
documented in chimpanzees. There are a host of previous studies
that have shown that chimpanzees will exchange objects or tokens
Table 1. Individual Performance on the Two- and Three-PVC
Test Conditions.
Two PVC Pipes Three PVC Pipes
Subject Session 1% Tests Session 1% Tests
Abby 50 5 90* 1
Artemus 50 12 74* 2
Azalea 60 F
Brandy 85* 1 75* 3
Brodie 50 4 90* 1
Callie 50 9 100* 1
Carl 60 3 95* 1
Cathy 50 20 25 4
Cissie 50 7 50 3
David 85* 1 55* 3
Elvira 75* 11 50 3
Faye 75* 2 95* 1
Fiona 85* 1 55* 1
Foxy 55 F
Frannie 60 3 95* 1
Fritz 55 F
Gelb 95* 1 55* 4
Jacqueline 70 15 85* 1
Julie 65 5 65* 4
Katrina 100* 1 100* 1
Lamar 70 2 100* 1
Lil’One 50 F
Liza 50 19 80* 1
Lucas 50 4 100* 1
Melissa 100* 1 80* 1
Patrick 75* 2 60* 3
Rebecca 100* 1 80* 1
Rita 65 6 55* 2
Sabrina 50 5 40 5
Scott 85* 1 85* 1
Shirley 65 7 45 4
Socrates 55 20 55* 5
Sylvia 60 4 45 2
Tara 60 5 60* 3
F= failed to reach criterion within 20 test sessions.
*indicates significantly better than chance performance during session 1 tests.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0079338.t001
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for food offered by humans [e.g., 38,40]. It seems logical that in
order for chimpanzees to learn to perform such behaviors they
must understand something about request gestures. It might be
suggested that the pretraining the chimpanzees received on
placing the rock in a single tube, prior to the subsequent initial
tests may have influenced their performance but we do not believe
this to be the case. Unfortunately, we did not record the number of
pretraining sessions the chimpanzees received prior to the onset of
the two-PVC-pipe condition. Therefore we cannot fully rule out
this possibility but we would subjectively note that very few
chimpanzees needed much pretraining given their previous
experiences in bartering with humans. Additionally, the assump-
tion is that the pretraining had a facilitative effect on subsequent
performance on the two-PVC-pipe conditions but, arguably, the
case could be made that it could have an inhibitory effect on
performance. In this case, pretraining on the placement of a single
rock into the PVC pipe would have reinforced the canalization of
this response without consideration of the need to attend to social
cues in order to place the rock in the correct tube in the two-PVC-
pipe condition.
As noted above, the very claim that chimpanzees do not
comprehend human pointing and requesting has been refuted for
quite some time, going all the way back to some of the early ape
language studies [e.g., 27,30,36]. None of this research was cited in
the paper by Kirchhofer et al. [24], despite the fact that they
challenge the very foundation and rationale for their study. Of
course, the argument might be made that the so-called language-
trained chimpanzees are not a fair or legitimate comparison group
for discussion of basic OCT skills in chimpanzees because they
have had extensive interactions with humans and may have been
inadvertently ‘‘trained’’ to perform such tasks. As far as we know,
however, humans require the same extensive interactions with
other humans before they display the same sorts of competencies,
therefore this argument is invalid [e.g., 26]. For example, typically
developing humans do not develop this comprehension until well
into their second year of life [e.g., 1]. If it could be demonstrated
that human children develop the ability to comprehend both
spoken and gestural referents despite being isolated from typical
human interactions, then this argument might hold, but we are
unaware of any such demonstration. To the contrary, children
raised in austere institutional settings display global sociocognitive
deficiencies [e.g., 41]. Moreover, Kirchhofer and her colleagues
[24] made no apparent attempt to isolate the dogs in their study
from extensive interactions with humans, therefore, the groups
were not matched on this critical life history variable. This
observation highlights a significant problem with current attempts
to compare the cognitive abilities of pet dogs with zoo- and
laboratory-living apes. Specifically, dogs have been selectively bred
for the purposes of co-existence with humans but more impor-
tantly, most dogs in cognitive studies are pets and have extensive
backgrounds with their owners. From this perspective, the only
chimpanzees that should be compared to pet dogs are those that
have extensive experience with humans. Zoo- or sanctuary-living
chimpanzees, even those with extensive research backgrounds, are
not a valid comparison group to a domesticated sample of pet
dogs.
The problem with using pet dogs for comparison to chimpan-
zees (or nearly any other species) is not limited to the degree of
experience or domestication they have with their human
companions. More problematic is the simple fact that pet dogs
used in cognitive research are not randomly selected. There are at
least two particularly salient sampling problems that afflict this line
of research. First, researchers studying pet dogs, including the
studies by Kirchhofer et al. [24], recruit dog subjects by
advertising and the owners then sign their pets up to serve as
subjects in this research. This raises the question: who signs up
their dog to be in a research project on canine cognition? In all
likelihood, these are owners who have dogs that typically are very
human oriented and are likely to do well on these kinds of tasks.
This, by itself, would not be problematic, but the chimpanzees (or
again any other species) are randomly selected. Chimpanzees or
other species used for comparison to pet dogs are selected by
convenience. In the present study, or in the study by Kirchhofer
et al. [24], the chimpanzee subjects were selected because they
reside at YNPRC or other research facilities and were available for
use. In our view, this significant difference in subject selection
makes comparisons between pet dogs and conveniently sampled
chimpanzees illegitimate.
The second obvious contemporary sampling bias with pet dogs,
possibly a consequence of the first, is that dog breeds are not
randomly sampled within the species. Thus, of the 32 dogs in their
study, fully 27 (84%) were from working dog breeds, including
retrievers or retriever mixes (n=14) and an additional 13 (40%)
other working dog breeds, such as border collies, German
shepherds, German pointers, and so on. Only 5 dogs (16% of
their sample) were from non-retrieving, non-working breeds.
Thus, although it is clear from their study that retrievers are very
good at retrieving, the dog sample in Kirchhofer et al. [24] was
very far from being representative of the range of extant dog
breeds, and therefore their results do not even generalize to all
dogs. The problem of selection bias for pet dogs has recently been
illustrated in several studies that examined OCT performance in
pet dogs compared to a ‘‘random’’ sample of dogs living in animal
shelters [21,42]. In these studies, the shelter dogs perform more
poorly than the pet dogs and this has been attributed to variation
in their experience with humans. We would suggest that it is also
just as plausible that shelter dogs are a more representative sample
of canine capacities for the OCT performance and that pet dogs
represent a highly biased group of individuals and do not reflect
the inherent abilities of dogs for the OCT.
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